John Raaen and a portion of the 5th Ranger Battalion were detached and under the command of Sullivan [Annotator’s Note: Major John P. Sullivan]. Sullivan had three companies in his approach to Maisy [Annotator’s Note: Maisy was the location of a significant German fortified artillery, command and hospital emplacement behind the Normandy beaches]. The command included an 81mm mortar company, Company C. The mortar company was a full Ranger company that had converted its 60mm mortars to three or four 81mm mortars. Additionally, a few extra crewmen from other then under strength companies were added. There were other heavy weapons plus the support of the 58th [Annotator’s Note: 58th Field Artillery Battalion] for Sullivan and the 5th Rangers. The group approached Maisy in a column with Company F leading, followed by Company A and then the mortar company in the rear. Upon reaching a road junction just before Maisy, the column went off road. Moving down the face of a ridge facing Maisy, there was a flooded area between the Americans and Maisy. A fire fight ensued when Company F ran into minor enemy resistance and deployed. Company A bypassed the lead company action. Progressing a few hundred yards further, Company A attempted to cross the water but discovered it was too deep. After a further advance, the company crossed the water and fixed bayonets for a charge. The charge resulted in the surrender of many Germans. Some SS officers reacted by shooting their own people when they attempted to surrender. At that point, the resistance stiffened. Raaen could not confirm the extent of casualties. Meanwhile, Company F had completed its firefight and joined the attack on a row of Tobruks [Annotator’s Note: Tobruks are nicknames for fortified positions]. The series of Tobruks were each two hundred meters apart. Reville [Annotator’s Note: Second Lieutenant John J. Reville ] took his platoon and, using suppressive machine gun fire, drove the defenders away from their firing positions so the Rangers could use 40 pound satchel charges to destroy the strongholds. After two Tobruks were taken in that manner, the rest of those positions were abandoned. Having passed the flooded area, Reville and his platoon turned and attacked the other positions with Company A on its right. Company C had remained, as ordered, at the intersection. Sullivan pulled Company C forward to attack with Company A. The two companies merged after clearing the area. The combat took about five hours. A bloody fight, most casualties resulted from mine injuries. The German Bouncing Betty mines had been rigged up in sets of ten so if one detonated, they all did. That resulted in injuries distant from the initial explosion. In one case, four people were wounded on one trip wire. There were many injured and significant blood in order to take Maisy.

John Raaen spent time in the hedgerow area of Normandy after Maisy [Annotator’s Note: Maisy was the location of a significant German fortified artillery, command and hospital emplacement behind the Normandy beaches]. The 5th Ranger Battalion companies consolidated and were joined by the 2nd Ranger Battalion. A CP [Annotator’s Note: command post] was established at Osmanville as headquarters in support of Schneider [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Max F. Schneider]. The S2 [Annotator’s Note: intelligence officer] would receive reports of German stragglers and assign a company to clean out the resistance. That process took three or four days near the beachhead. Missions would go all the way back to Grandcamp. It was facilitated by the arrival of the vehicles for the battalion. A rifle squad or section could be loaded into a truck and brought to the location in question. After clearing the resistance, any prisoners would be turned over to the 29th Infantry Division MPs [Annotator’s Note: military police]. Wounded would be transported to the hospital. Quite a few men were wounded during those operations. After the mission, the men would return to the battalion. Multiple CPs were set up as the battalion moved through the Norman region. Raaen returned to the beach several times. He saw the 2nd Infantry Division climbing the cliffs as seen in the famous picture of those reinforcements arriving on the Normandy beach. He had almost the exact perspective on the arrival of the 2nd as the photographer did. Raaen received the Silver Star for what he considered was merely doing his duty. Like the other veterans who had "seen the elephant" [Annotator’s Note: a metaphor for seeing combat which is too difficult to explain unless personally witnessed], he did desperate things some of which were heroic. It was the only way to get the job done. Some things he did to receive the decoration might be considered silly or even stupid. An example was single handedly taking on a reconnaissance mission for Sullivan [Annotator’s Note: Major John P. Sullivan]. It was dangerous but Sullivan needed the information. Raaen led a patrol on D+1 even though a company commander did not have to do so. He took it on because he thought it was the best means to get the job done. The battalion staff sergeant could have accomplished the job, but it would not have been like having an officer on the patrol. Raaen personally provided the 29th Infantry Division the report. In another instance when he and a noncommissioned officer reached heavy enemy fire, they placed the jeep in neutral and got under it and pulled it across the fusillade. During the incident, the gasoline tank must have been hit because Raaen could not complete his journey because of lack of fuel. Later in the war, the men learned to race jeeps through incoming fire. Some of the men that Raaen commanded were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and that may have contributed to his Silver Star. The award just seemed to be the result of a lot of different actions he took. Gathering ammunition and getting it to a task force was part of his job although some would think he was heroic in doing it. The enlisted men knew the details of the actions so clerks could have taken part in the decision for Captain Raaen’s receipt of the Silver Star. After Maisy, the 5th Ranger Battalion was taken off the front line and moved forward with two companies on 30 minute alert in case the Germans attacked them from the rear. This was particularly worrisome with the Germans commanding the islands such as Jersey just offshore of the Norman coast. When new replacements arrived in the battalion, they would often be sent on strengthened patrols near the front in order to get some combat experience. This relieved some of the veterans on the front line so they could get much needed rest. Some casualties resulted from this decision. Raaen was ordered in mid to late July [Annotator’s Note: 1944] to go into Brittany and find the 8th Corps and determine the orders for the 5th Ranger Battalion and prepare the positions for them. He did so but orders changed for the battalion with the German counter-offensive near Mortain. The 5th was ordered to prepare to block the Germans but they were never in combat. Raaen missed that and never knew it happened until reading about it. Meanwhile, Raaen laid out the marshalling area for the battalion.

John Raaen and the 5th Ranger Battalion was participating in the Saar Campaign when the Battle of the Bulge broke out on 16 December 1944. Prior to that start, the Rangers would send out long range reconnaissance patrols behind German lines to observe the types of vehicles and count the numbers that were on the move. Reports were being sent back to S2 [Annotator’s Note: intelligence officer at the battalion level] who would report to G2 [Annotator’s Note: intelligence officer at the division or higher level]. There were no problems with the eight or so patrols that were sent out until 16 December. They could not get through the heavily reinforced German positions. After several nights of attempts, the order came for the battalion to set up a World War I type box barrage around a selected sector. A company was to be sent in and retrieve a German officer as a prisoner. While the encircling barrage occurred, two Ranger companies charged in and wiped out a couple of German companies and managed to return with a major as prisoner. No one, including Raaen, was able to talk to the German before he was whisked away. Two days later, Raaen became a casualty. Although the Germans initially barreled through the front lines at the onset of the Battle of the Bulge, the American troops began to mobilize and resist. Units like the 28th Infantry Division under Cota [Annotator’s Note: General Norman Cota] with Rudder [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel James Earl Rudder] as a regimental commander held the line after the initial shock. This reduced the German mobility as they jammed up when roads were blocked by these defenders. A prime example of this was in front of Bastogne which was a major road intersection point. The German advance was not as rapid as might be thought. American Army support units and outfits picked up rifles and manned the defensive lines to repel the enemy. The Bulge was not the disaster some thought it to be. The Rangers got word on the night of 22 December to be on the alert for disengaging their fighting units and getting headquarters and rear echelons ready to move. Raaen was S4 [Annotator’s Note: logistics and supply officer for the battalion] at the time. He had most of the trucks and kitchens and so forth. He took one long range radio jeep to the rear and sent one forward. As he moved, there was bumper to bumper total black out on the ridgeline under direct observation of German artillery. That was the end as he was hit and thrown toward the back right near the rear wheel. He broke a leg and hip and lacerated his face. The road was under direct German artillery fire and not useable during the day. The enemy had an open advantage of fire on about a mile of the road. The two jeeps could not move and the driver of the other jeep was out of his mind. He repeatedly offered to help Captain Raaen until the officer finally told the supplicant to join him. Shortly afterward, medics appeared and said they were establishing an aid station in a nearby farmhouse. Raaen warned them that the station would be within easy enemy artillery range. Raaen next told them to call his command using the phone number "Vat 69" [Annotator’s Note: a popular Scotch at the time]. That was it.

John Raaen returned to the United States for recovery in early February [Annotator’s Note: February 1945] after being wounded on 22 December. During his hospital stay, he would be placed on leave when not undergoing treatment. Originally in a cast, he used crutches to go anywhere he wanted during the day. He had to return to the hospital at night. As he progressed in his recovery, he was placed in a walking cast and allowed to visit his family and girlfriend in Arlington [Annotator’s Note: Arlington, Virginia]. He was allowed to stay home two or three days at a time and then return to the hospital for treatment and examination. He did away with his cane when he was married. His release from hospital was early May or June. He was a captain when he was wounded. He was promoted to major while at Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1950. Raaen learned of his new rank when his old boss told him he was out of uniform. Raaen knew he was properly dressed, but his friend informed him that he was not in the correct uniform for a major. That was how Raaen discovered he had been promoted. He had been a captain a long time. Promotions came slow in the Army except on the battlefield. Raaen had talked with General Gerhardt [Annotator’s Note: General Charles H. Gerhardt] at Brest. Gerhardt suggested that any of the company commanders in the 5th Rangers would be offered a battalion if they joined up with him and his division. Raaen responded that it was a good deal to jump from a captain to a lieutenant colonel. Gerhardt responded that he had sergeants leading battalions since his previously well organized division had suffered extensive battle casualties in the officer and other ranks. Gerhardt was very much in need of combat experienced officers. Neither Raaen nor any of the company commanders accepted Gerhardt’s offer. They felt a real allegiance to the Rangers and their esprit de corps. Raaen retired in 1979.

John Raaen dated a nurse at the General Hospital at Cherbourg. They enjoyed dancing and drinking champagne when they were out on a date. The champagne had been liberated by Raaen in his previous experiences. He met the nurse while visiting with his wounded men who were in recovery in the hospital. When Raaen inquired about his men with the nurse, she laughed at him. He was taken aback and asked why she was laughing. She said all that the men talked about was "the old man" and Raaen turned out to be "the old man." Raaen was 22 years old at the time in 1944. She thought it was hilarious that he was designated as "the old man" at his young age. The nurse would go on to serve 30 years in the Army and retire as a lieutenant colonel. Her career took her beyond nursing requirements and likely into management roles with the advancement in rank. In Vietnam, a full colonel nurse was the senior nurse in USARV [Annotator’s Note: United States Army Republic of Vietnam]. Raaen recounts an incident after his departure from Vietnam when a nurse was on the "biffy" and a mortar explosion blew out the floor under her and she fell through. Raaen was in the United States when VE-Day [Annotator’s Note: Victory in Europe Day, 8 May 1945] occurred. He was in Walter Reed Hospital and phoned his fiancée to tell her of the news. Shortly beforehand, he had called her to tell her that Roosevelt [Annotator’s Note: President Franklin D. Roosevelt] died. On VJ-Day [Annotator’s Note: Victory over Japan Day, 14 August 1945], Raaen was married and at West Point. All the combat veterans in his apartment celebrated happily as they knew they would not have to go fight the Japanese. Because of their experience in Europe, they would have been on the short list for that fight. The wives were very happy about the news, also.

John Raaen disagrees with Gary Sterne [Annotator’s Note: Gary Sterne discovered the buried site of the large complex of the Maisy battery] and confirms that the battery that Len Lomell [Annotator’s Note: 2nd Ranger Battalion First Sergeant Leonard Lomell] found was the one withdrawn from Pointe du Hoc. The 155mm battery had five guns. One of the battery guns was damaged previously and sent for repairs at Cherbourg. Those remaining guns had to be the ones withdrawn from Pointe du Hoc. The Germans would not have removed their heavy weapons far from that strategic location. There was overlapping German artillery fire on the beaches between Longville and Pointe du Hoc. That capability would not have been minimized as long as the Germans intended to defend the Atlantic Wall [Annotator’s Note: the Germans referred to their fortified positions from Norway to Spain as Hitler’s Atlantic Wall]. The guns may have even had other supplementary positions besides the one discovered. Overlapping fire would have been the priority for covering the beaches. Lomell’s discovery of the battery in the position was a very logical point for the guns to serve their purpose in defending the Omaha Beach area. The guns were relocated because a heavy Allied bombing mission damaged one of the guns on 15 April. That gun had to be sent for repairs to Cherbourg. Within two weeks, the other guns were withdrawn inland for camouflage and protection. Telephone poles replaced the guns on the Pointe. There may have been other undiscovered camouflaged areas. Raaen knew the Germans would not have completely pulled the guns back out of range of the beach. The guns had never been fired. When the breech was opened, there was a propellant charge and a shell in the tube. Lomell used his thermite grenade to destroy the elevating mechanism on the weapon. Lomell and Jack Kuhn [Annotator’s Note: a sergeant in the 2nd Ranger Battalion] disabled any capability to adjust range on the guns. They destroyed two of the guns. The other three artillery pieces were destroyed by Sergeant Repenski [Annotator’s Note: unsure of spelling] with a five or six man patrol. He also blew up the ammunition. The sergeant found another sixth gun a short distance away and left a man to guard it. It was a 155mm between hedgerows. The guard was a man named Burnett who would survive the battle. Repenski and the remainder of the patrol was either killed or captured. He and his patrol were recognized as finishing off the rest of the battery and ammunition. The German guns were likely recycled to create ammunition for the Allies. Eikner [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant James W. Eikner] was company headquarters commander and kept all the records for the battalion. He had a huge file of documents. Raaen only brought a footlocker home. He was happy just to get home. Eikner was with the 2nd Rangers and landed at Pointe du Hoc. He was said to be the man who sent the mission failure report to the other Rangers [Annotator’s Note: that failure report resulted in the 5th Rangers landing at Dog White sector of Omaha Beach instead of following behind the companies of the 2nd Ranger Battalion which were scaling the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc]. Tom Herring was the official historian for the battalion but he passed. Frank South, a university professor in Delaware, followed up but he died also. The battalion papers may be in the University of Delaware archives.

John Raaen saw a lot of smoke and heard a lot of noise from small arms fire from the right side. It was from WN70 which was a small redoubt to provide enfilade fire on Omaha Beach where the Rangers and others were landing. There was little fire from the front and no mortar fire that Raaen remembers. There were lots of smells and blood around. Pools of blood could be seen in the puddles of water. The sounds were deafening, especially the artillery detonations. The fragmenting shells had a shattering sound. For the German artillery, the big prizes were the boats coming ashore, not the individuals on the beach. One LCI [Annotator’s Note: Landing Craft, Infantry] might contain about 250 men. They could be largely eliminated from the action with one direct hit. A hit on a small landing craft could get 35 soldiers with one shot. As a result, the artillery concentrated on worthwhile targets. Once on the beach, there was a torrent of small arms fire. Luckily, Colonel Schneider [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Max F. Schneider] had convinced the British to bring the Rangers in on Dog Red Beach where there were 14 stone breakwaters about four feet or more high. The men used them as cover. The seawall was on one side and the retards were on the other two sides forming a fort for the assault troops. The retards extended about 25 feet from the seawall and were about 25 feet apart. The assault troops found themselves in a 25 by 25 by 25 foot fort. There was good protection provided as long as there were no counterattacks or mortar fire from the enemy. The tall and steep bluffs prevented inland artillery from hitting the beach. As a result, the only artillery came from the direct fire at the two ends of the beach. Much of the incoming artillery came from the Vierville end because the Rangers had landed almost exactly one mile from the Vierville exit. Most of the troops who had preceded the Rangers onto Dog White beach were 29th Infantry Division. Many of the planned landing sites were missed. Landings in different locations not according to plan was commonplace. Beach brigade people were there attempting to organize the landings and movement off the beach. Everyone was pinned down. The smoke in the front of Raaen obstructed the enemy vision plus there were fires on the cliffs which drove the defenders from their protected places. They abandoned their automatic weapons while doing so. With no enemy fire from the front, there was a protecting portion of ground that kept fire from the left from reaching the assault troops. The machine guns on the left were beyond effective range against the Rangers. WN70 was about half way or half a mile from D1. It was within effective machine gun range. Raaen could see automatic fire hit the water near him. There were also individuals shooting their rifles from the bluffs. Most incoming troops in the proximity attempted to find cover behind the breakwater and seawall. Further away, there was no protection. The sand dunes did not provide much cover. The fire on the bluffs and the smoke were very helpful in shielding the men coming ashore. The initial wave of troops had 200 yards of exposed beach to traverse. By the time Raaen came in, there was only 50 to 75 yards of exposed tidal beach to travel across. Upon hitting the beach, Raaen could hear many men screaming for a medic. With the water rising one yard per minute on the beach, the men were trying to crawl toward the seawall to escape the rising tide. Individuals who did not dare get out of the water were scrambling to keep ahead of the surging tide. Men would drown if they could not move quickly enough. Taking shelter behind obstacles and debris was common. Taking cover behind boat debris was not wise. The boats were being shelled. For Raaen, the landing was a cake walk compared to the preparatory training. Raaen had one man, his runner, wounded. The man had paused as bullets hit the water. He resumed in time for the next burst to find him. The runner had a flesh wound. It was a million dollar wound [Annotator’s Note: a common joke in the service during the war was that a non-fatal wound which resulted in a return to the United States for recovery was called a million dollar wound]. The key to forward progress on the beach was to go where the previous burst hit. The machine gunner’s aim would be trained in a different location for the next burst. Shortly after landing, Raaen took stock of the men under his command and got his non-coms to organize their teams. He then proceeded to locate Sullivan [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Sullivan] near the seawall. There was no room at the breakwater because of the pile up of men who had previously landed with the 29th Infantry Division. Raaen offered to check with Schneider [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Max Schneider]. Sullivan told Raaen to stay with the command on the beach and that he, Sullivan, would find Schneider. Raaen was to prepare his men to withstand a potential counterattack from the bluffs. Meanwhile, the Rangers indicated where Schneider could be found nearby, and Sullivan went over and briefed the commander. Within minutes, Sullivan returned with orders for Raaen to move over three bays and prepare his men to follow the machine gun company through the blown wire on the beach. While doing so, he spotted an individual standing tall on the beach with a cigar. He was shouting at his men and encouraging them. It turned out to be Cota [Annotator’s Note: General Norman D. Cota, Sr., assistant division commander of the 29th Infantry Division at Normandy]. They shared status information and Cota sought out the battalion commander. As he left to see Schneider, Cota told the men not to let him down. Cota told Schneider that the men had to get off the beach and the Rangers had to lead the way. That ultimately led to the motto "Rangers Lead the Way." Raaen followed the orders and his training set in to assist him. Raaen moved three bays to the left and watched the machine gun company go by and followed them through the wire and up the hill. There was no much fire because of the protection of the retards except when they stepped up and tried to cross the paved road. The terrain was favorable for the Americans. There would be a stray shot but most of the machine guns were trained to the beach below. The road was somewhat sunken and was about ten to 15 feet across. There was barbed wire on the opposite side. It was difficult to see flashes from the enemy guns. The German rifles and machine guns were smokeless and flashless. Raaen reported to his father who was executive officer to the Chief of Ordnance that the American weapons were not as sophisticated as the enemy’s. Raaen felt that the United States should be able to develop that level of sophistication in its ammunition so that they would also be smokeless and flashless. The German could not be spotted as readily when he was firing. Raaen’s keen sense of hearing did enable him to determine the enemy position just by listening to his weapon firing. The LCA [Annotator’s Note: Landing Craft, Assault] that Raaen came to the Omaha in was hit just as Father Lacy [Annotator’s Note: Father Joe Lacy was a lieutenant in the 5th Rangers] was getting off. Despite being hit on the fantail, the LCA did make it back safely.

John Raaen and the men around him were ready to get on with the job that they were trained to do. They were tired of being shot at; they wanted to do the shooting. The way up to the top of the cliff was a single man path. They saw a dead German on the way up. There was no resistance as they proceeded upward. By the time the assault troops with Raaen were through the wire, the firing had stopped. They advanced through a hollow even though there was a risk of it being booby trapped. He knew it would be safer than exposing the men to enemy fire. That location turned out to be safe and prevented small arms fire from hitting his men. It was about 100 yards to the top of the bluff from the beach. There was undergrowth to take cover behind at the peak if needed, but it was unnecessary. Prior to going up the pathway, Raaen noticed five steps at the base of the hill. He sat down and took note of the action on the beach. Boats were coming in and men were hurrying to take cover behind the seawall. Other troops were advancing through the four holes blown in the wire by Raaen and his men plus the two other holes that Company C, 116th [Annotator’s Note: Company C, 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division] had blown in the wire. No one wanted to stay on the beach and die. Navy people were grabbing weapons from the casualties and following the troops. The men of the 29th were moving forward with the progress of the Rangers. At the top of the bluff, Raaen discovered a small wall and sat on it to observe the beach once again. The status was the same with boats coming in and troops advancing to the seawall and then through the six gaps in the wire and up the pathway. There was still quite a bit of enemy fire at that stage. Company A, 2nd Ranger BNattalion had likely taken out WN70 [Annotator’s Note: WN70 was one of the many strong points that the Germans had constructed in the cliffs across the beaches to provide intersecting artillery fire on the invasion troops]. Company A probably went right on up the hill and through WN70 without even recognizing what they had accomplished. They likely felt it was just a few Germans in trenches and Tobruks [Annotator’s Note: Tobruks are fortified positions]. After taking out WN70, the men of Company A, 2nd Rangers turned left and linked up with the 5th Ranger Battalion at the top of the bluff overlooking the beach. Raaen and his men got off the beach quickly in 20 to 30 minutes after landing at 0750 which was H hour plus 80 [Annotator’s Note: H hour was the time of the initial landings with Raaen landing 80 minutes afterward]. It took the predecessor troops in the initial waves of the landing, the 116th, 80 minutes longer to exit the beach than Raaen and his men. The next objective was Vierville, but it was hurry up and wait. The initial companies that blew wire moved their platoons up in column with two squads abreast. The opposition was light at the top of the bluffs. There was smoke and flames at the top and the Germans behind that were surprised and overwhelmed quickly. Companies C and D [Annotator’s Note: Companies C and D, 5th Ranger Battalion] engagements resulted in disposal of two German machine gun nests even though a grenadier had neglected to pull the pin on a grenade that landed in the midst of one of the enemy positions. Dawson [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Francis Dawson] pulled his Tommy gun and eliminated the enemy personnel. That probably was one reason Dawson received a DSC [Annotator’s Note: Distinguished Service Cross]. It was about the same thing for Company C. There were essentially no casualties in their climb to the top but there was a small fire fight to their right and they approached a German position from the rear on the crest of the hill and took it out.

After exiting the beach at Normandy, John Raaen and his men followed the hedgerows in case they would be fired upon. The crops grown there were about two or three feet tall and appeared to be wheat. A man could drop in the field and the Germans would never see them. If the first rounds did not hit a man, he could drop and move away from his original position without being discovered. It was possible to move on the enemy position just by following the sound of their fire. A decision would have to be made during the approach on how to take out the position. If a BAR [Annotator’s Note: Browning automatic rifle] was available, a frontal attack would be the option considered. Without a BAR, a move on the enemy’s flanks or rear might be more in order. The goal at all times during the action was to stay alive [Annotator’s Note: Raaen says this with gusto and then chuckles]. Raaen and his command were the loose cannon without a designated job during the course of this early action. He simply went where the fighting was heated. Although he was in command of headquarters, none was to be established during this time. The battalion commander had his S3 [Annotator’s Note: operations officer at the battalion level] and possibly his S2 [Annotator’s Note: intelligence officer at the battalion level] with him along with a few non-coms to support them. He also would have a radio operator and two or three runners to carry messages out to his companies. That left Raaen without a job so Sullivan [Annotator’s Note: Major Richard P. Sullivan] looked to him when he had a special thing needing to be accomplished. Raaen queried Sullivan about battalion status when they were 100 yards from the bluffs overlooking the beaches. Sullivan was unsure but wanted Raaen to reconnoiter a fence line as a possible means to protect advancing troops coming up behind them. Raaen did so and was shot at. He thought that most of the fire was from American forces. The fence line had uncut foliage growing through it. Raaen reached the other end and a hedgerow that was there. He discovered a dead German in the hedgerow. Raaen had to work his way back to report to Sullivan. In the process, he was shot at several more times. Progressing on the coastal road that ran toward Vierville from Grand-Camp, Sullivan said the situation was out of control. He ordered "Red" [Annotator’s Note: seemingly a nickname for Raaen] to find his right flank. Raaen took off to do so. He took to a ditch alongside a hedgerow. Raaen finally discovered the end of the battalion. After finding the end of the battalion, he ran into a patrol from the 1st Infantry Division. The patrol included three paratroopers who were dropped into the area of the 1st. They must have come down 30 or 40 miles off target. Raaen took the patrol back to Schneider [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Max Schneider] and Sullivan. The Rangers were shelled while in an open field after they had progressed down the fence line to the hedgerow. There were a few casualties, but the men were largely able to tell where the shells would fall when they would hear the incoming. Every field was marked Achtung Minen [Annotator’s Note: German for "attention mines"]. Because of the risk, units moved in column across the fields. It was the equivalent of two squad columns for the whole battalion. It resulted in a slow advance of the battalion. Although Raaen and the 5th Rangers were initially slated to relieve the 2nd Rangers on the Pointe [Annotator’s Note: Pointe du Hoc], only Parker [Annotator’s Note: Captain Charles H. Parker] with Farley [Annotator’s Note: Private First Class Daniel D. Farley, Jr. of A Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion] and others managed to do so. The Pointe was less than five miles from the bivouac location for Raaen and his men on the first night of the invasion. A landing at the planned location of Vierville would have resulted in a different outcome. Parker received the word from the ad hoc briefing of company commanders on the beach that the "tally ho" was on. The Rangers were to advance on their objectives. It took about five to ten minutes to organize the Bangalore torpedo men and the machine gun and mortar crews to prepare for the assault to exit the beach. When Parker gave the word, the progress was quick. He was the first up the bluffs and off the beach. Parker met very little resistance. The men under him advanced on the Pointe. He followed a hedgerow just to the left of Raaen and his command. A platoon commander named Oscar Suchier received a simple wound but it was temporarily incapacitating. After he was bandaged, Suchier attempted to catch up with Parker who was about five minutes ahead of him. It was at that juncture that a message came from Schneider that General Cota [Annotator’s Note: General Norman D. Cota] wanted the troops to operate as a battalion and not as infiltrating platoons. Consequently, they were to take a position on the left flank of the advance. As a result, Suchier was blocked by orders from following Parker. His platoon stayed with the battalion. Parker and another platoon proceeded to a farm called Chateau Vomacel [Annotator’s Note: unsure of spelling]. While there, Parker assisted a platoon of the 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division fight off a German counterattack. Afterward, the platoon from the 116th left Parker and returned to Vierville to find its parent outfit. Parker waited about an hour and decided that the other troops had gone ahead of him. He proceeded to the assembly area on the southwest of Vierville. No one was there so he went on to the Pointe. There was a squad or two from Company E that did not follow Parker. When that group reached the coastal road, there was a fire fight. Several men were wounded. They were pulled to the adjacent ditch and left with water and a rifle stuck in the ground to indicate their position. The night of D-Day was when Raaen learned the difference between a haystack and a manure pile. He did not remember sleeping but he did recollect enforcing a black out requirement on a French woman who was cooking on faggots [Annotator’s Note: this may refer to a bundle of sticks]. It was a small fire and she allowed Raaen and Van Riper [Annotator’s Note: First Lieutenant Howe E. Van Riper] to warm their hands when the food was not cooking. There was a meeting with General Cota and Metcalf [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel John Alfred Metcalfe, III] who was a battalion commander in the 116th plus Schneider and his staff. Together, they planned the objectives for the next day.

John Raaen and his outfit [Annotator's Note: Headquarters Company, 5th Ranger Battalion] drove toward Saint-Pierre-du-Mont the next day [Annotator's Note: on 7 June 1944]. Although Raaen managed to acquire a jeep, its fuel tank was hit by enemy fire and it leaked gasoline. That resulted in the jeep not being able to bring Raaen to his objective. The day started out with a German counterattack of company strength hitting a Ranger force about 200 yards from Raaen’s location. Seeing American tanks, Raaen jumped aboard and banged on the turret to get the commander of the vehicle to take notice of the Germans. The tank commander radioed his platoon commander and took off to attack the enemy. Raaen inquired why the tank did not fire its cannon. It was using only .50 caliber machine guns. The response given was that the target was too small and ill-defined to use cannon ammunition. Nevertheless, the counterattack was thrown back using the machine guns on the tanks. Sullivan [Annotator’s Note: Major Richard P. Sullivan] told Raaen to take a patrol and inspect the Vierville road back to the beach. He took with him the battalion Sergeant Major and a Master Sergeant along with a driver. They ran into a group of Germans and a fire fight ensued. The Rangers pursued the enemy along the coastal road. When Raaen and his group returned and were near the battalion, the two sergeants said they had to return to their command. That left Raaen with his driver, Corporal Sharp [Annotator’s Note: Jack L. Sharp]. The two men decided to report to the 29th Infantry Division as Raaen’s orders designated. They passed through the MP [Annotator’s Note: military police] security and made their way to General Gerhardt [Annotator’s Note: General Charles H. Gerhardt] and his G3 section [Annotator’s Note: operations officer at the division level]. It was a surprise to Raaen that the general had already made it ashore. The general requested a status report from Raaen on the 5th Rangers. Asked what could be done to help them, Raaen told Gerhardt that the battalion needed ammunition, both mortar and machine gun. Gerhardt turned to his aide de camp and ordered him to bring Raaen to the beach and assure that he received everything that was needed from the ASP [Annotator’s Note: ammunition supply point]. Raaen received a jeep loaded with ammunition. It was stacked above the driver’s head. Raaen and his driver exited the beach in pursuit of the Ranger relief column. The column was well out of sight. That column was mainly Rangers from the 5th Ranger Battalion but also included some survivors of the 2nd. Additionally, there was Company C, 116th [Annotator’s Note: 116th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division] and eight tanks. This was planned to be the regimental advance guard, but when things got dicey, the rest of the relief remained in Vierville to fight off a significant German counterattack. After Sullivan, Metcalfe [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel John Alfred Metcalfe, III] and the tanks left, there were word false reports from an officer that Vierville had been recaptured and the whole of Dog Green beach had been wiped out. A coin was tossed and Raaen was given the assignment to reconnoiter the situation. While Raaen was headed to Saint-Pierre-du-Mont, he ran into a major with the 29th Division who was riding a bicycle. He told Raaen that the 175th [Annotator’s Note: 175th Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division]had just landed and was making its way to Pointe du Hoc. They were looking to be relieved within two hours. Raaen did not see the major again so he was commander of the force. The beach did hold and Vierville was not retaken. The only misconception was that the 175th was not headed to Pointe du Hoc but in another direction. Raaen got to the advance column and arranged the force in a perimeter defense. They had no anti-tank weapons and expected to be overrun by German tanks but nothing happened. The next morning, just as the advance unit was readying itself to move on Pointe du Hoc, the whole regimental force with a battalion of tanks came up behind them. The regiment had the same plan of as that drafted by Raaen previously. Consequently, Raaen followed his plan and the rest of the troops followed behind his command. Raaen and his troops would reach the Pointe and relieve the 2nd Rangers there. As he looked out from the Pointe, Raaen saw the worst mess he had even seen. There were no trees standing. Not a blade of grass was left. Everything was shattered including the huge embrasures that the Germans had built. Bombs or offshore naval shelling had blown apart most of the structures. The battleships, including the Texas [Annotator’s Note: USS Texas (BB-35)] had fired large numbers of armor piercing and HE shells [Annotator’s Note: high explosive] at the fortifications. Nothing could have survived above ground, but there were numerous Germans below the ground. Even as Raaen was landing, the 2nd Rangers were fighting for their lives against a German counterattack nearby at Grandcamp.

John Raaen left Rudder and remnants of his battalion [Annotator’s Note: 5th Ranger Battalion] at the Pointe to reorganize. Many of Rudder’s [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder] men had to go through a significant change of squads, platoons and companies in the reorganization in order to form six workable Ranger companies. Less than 50 percent of the initial troops remained to restructure into that force. Schneider [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Max F. Schneider] also had problems as Companies F and A had to be reunited with their own platoons. The rest of the 5th had taken relatively light casualties. Raaen’s command had lost only one man during that time frame. Consequently, Schneider’s reorganization was much less severe. Orders came down from the 116th Infantry Regiment to form a task force to assist them in taking Grandcamp le Mer. Schneider broke off Sullivan and three companies which were in good shape. Two of the companies from the 5th were already near Grandcamp. Schneider maintained one company with him. He subsequently took that company to join up with the two companies already near Grandcamp. Schneider had direct command of those three companies. He also wanted to be near Rudder. Later, they would backtrack through Cricqueville. Sullivan had three companies and two workable 75mm guns on halftracks. A 4.2 inch mortar company was also attached to the Rangers as was the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The Rangers proceeded through Grandcamp which had been fought through by the 116th and the 743rd Tank Battalion. Raaen was in the rear of the column. He was ordered to clear the main street of snipers. He formed four teams of four men each. Two teams went house to house on each side of the street leapfrogging each other as they pressed forward. The teams cleared 20 or 30 houses that way. After the houses were cleared, Raaen and his men formed up a rear guard for Sullivan’s force. The men stopped for the night in the hedgerows between Grandcamp and Maisy. Security and watches for the evening were put in place. The next morning, word came that Metcalfe and the whole 116th had bypassed Maisy and were headed to their assigned objective at Isigny. Maisy was still in the way so Sullivan was ordered to capture it. Maisy was important as an objective. It had one anti-tank gun which was probably a Pak 36(r) [Annotator’s Note: German 7.62cm anti-tank gun] with a limited elevation. The gun could not reach the beach by 8,000 yards because of its limited elevation. None of the German guns could reach the beach, but that was not their mission. The artillery was there for any thrust down the Vire or Carentan Estuary which ran between Omaha and Utah beaches. Additionally, the guns could be trained on Utah beach, but were just out of range of Omaha. There is a question about whether Maisy ever fired on Utah beach. Raaen posited that the Maisy artillery drove them back from the attack on Saint-Pierre-du-Mont. It played a role in the regional defense, but its major role was as a major control center for either a division or at least a regiment of the German Army. It had the payroll for nearly the whole Normandy region. It also had four hospitals. It was a big, important base. Its vital role was to protect the Vire Estuary and protect against any landings near Grandcamp le Mer. It could also reach Pointe du Hoc. It punished the Rangers there on the first night. It was important to the planned German defense of the area but not necessarily for the sector of Omaha beach. It remains important because of its historical representation of the types of German fortifications that existed in the region during the World War II. Had the decision been made to assault up the Vire Estuary or near Grandcamp, the three German artillery batteries would have butchered the invasion troops nearby.

John Raaen attended West Point. His father was a career officer who graduated from the Military Academy on 1 November 1918. When Raaen entered kindergarten, his father was stationed at West Point. The discipline and military activities inspired the young boy to desire a role in the Army. His father was a coach for the wrestling team. Raaen knew all the members on that team. By the time he had reached the third grade, he had made up his mind to attend West Point. He entered the Point on 1 July 1939, just a few months before Germany invaded Poland. He had some complications with the eye examinations for entry but he got past them. He had a ruptured ear drum so he could not swim. He had an appointment given to him at birth by a local politician. When that politician faced defeat in a reelection, he provided Raaen with a first alternate nomination. Upon entry to the Point, he found his room on the top floor of a garret. He shared the room with Jimmy Brice. Brice told Raaen that he received the last bed in the building. Another individual had been afforded the option to go to the Military Academy or to the Naval Academy. The individual heard that Raaen wanted the appointment to the Military Academy so he opted for the Naval Academy Prep School at Columbia. Raaen’s father was a very good friend of the congressman who provided the appointment. Life at the Academy was similar to that of today. There was hazing, but it was not too severe. There was a three prong approach to the education at the Point. First, the students studied academics with core military engineering including chemistry, mathematics, and philosophy plus the humanities of English, French and Spanish. Unlike today, electives were not available. Many of today’s electives deal with economics or international politics. Alexander Haig majored in modern political structure. The second thing was military training including close order drill and weapons operation and maintenance. Weapons included the M1 rifle, the Browning automatic rifle, the 1919 machine gun and the 1911A1 pistol. There was combat infantry training plus weapons qualifications. Experience was gained with mortars and artillery by serving on gun crews. Everything was hands on with live fire. War had been declared so there was no problem getting ammunition for training. It was important to learn the aspects of loading, firing and operating various weapons types through actual experience in firing them. The third field of training involved the intramural system. If an individual was a member of an Academy team, he did not have to participate in intramural sports. Raaen was a fencer but started as a wrestler because of his education from his father. Although not too strong, he had good balance. He did not smoke so he had good endurance. The upper classman liked to wrestle Raaen, but if he hung in there long enough, his endurance could result in him doing pretty well. He did injure his knees and later overextended his elbow while playing Lacrosse. At that juncture, he switched over from wrestling to fencing. He knew nothing about his new sport. He spent four years on the Army fencing team. After the war, Raaen became a coach for the fencing team. In the 1948 Olympics, he coached the Army fencing team in the pentathlon. One of his men medaled. He took second place in the military pentathlon. Some thought was given to Raaen participating in the Olympics, but because he was educating military personnel, he was ineligible. After leaving the Military Academy, he coached the Naval Academy fencing team. They went on to beat the Army team. Raaen was proud of that accomplishment. Raaen heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor after he left a movie theater. At first, he assumed his friend was pulling a prank, but when the news was carried on all the radio stations, he knew it was the real thing. The cadets all rushed back to the barracks and turned on their radios and found out about the war. The cadets felt certain since 1 September [Annotator’s Note: 1 September 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland to begin World War II in Europe] that the United States would enter the war.

John Raaen saw the focus at the US Military Academy change after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It became obvious that the class was going to be graduated early. The senior year academic classes were compressed into six or seven months instead of a full nine months. There was a heavy focus on execution on how to be an officer. The veterans returning from combat taught the cadets the particulars related to day to day running of a military unit. A prime example was how to fill out a morning report. That instruction would never have been provided to the student prior to the urgency of getting company officers and commanders to the front. They had to know the basic requirements for a front line officer. They were taught how to run a duty roster because it was necessary to check up on the first sergeant in the field. There was practical knowledge provided about field expedient work issues. Examples that were taught to future engineer officers included how to build an A-frame to upright an overturned truck or how to build bridges. Gas mask and chemical warfare training was started. The focus became what would be immediately useful to the new officers after graduation. Following his graduation from West Point, Raaen was assigned to the 55th Armored Engineer Battalion, 10th Armored Division. On the Tennessee maneuvers, Raaen realized that he was not cut out for service in the armor. His father had been in infantry prior to being in ordnance. From the fourth grade, young Raaen had been reading tactics and techniques of infantry. He learned about scouting and reading maps. His father had gotten him a .22 rifle early on. Raaen had educated himself on that weapon. As a result, young Raaen had lived infantry most of his life. His tactics in the armor force were set by infantry guidelines for the field. That does not make for a success in armored assault. With tanks, it is necessary to buckle up and hit the objective and force your way through. The first units may be casualties but press onward through the enemy position. He knew he was not meant to be in the armor so when he noticed that there was recruitment for the 5th Ranger Battalion, he volunteered. The Rangers were looking for engineering experience like Raaen’s for fortifications, mine fields, obstacles and so forth. He was brought into the Ranger but never did a bit of engineering work. He immediately became a platoon leader and was back in the infantry. The Rangers at that time had the same complex training as that done by the Rangers today. Raaen joined the Rangers in Camp Forrest, Tennessee on 1 September 1943. He arrived in England on 19 January [Annotator’s Note: 1944] which was the same date that he had graduated from West Point a year earlier. The crossing took about a week. The first ship, the Isle de France, scheduled to take them to Europe was sabotaged and burned with multiple fires. The Mauritania brought the Rangers overseas. It also carried Admiral Stark [Annotator’s Note: Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations] but he was never seen by the troops. The Mauritania traveled at flank speed and completed its voyage in three or four days. It was uneventful except when the ship initially departed New York Harbor. The troops were on deck to observe the Statue of Liberty. They took note of a small freighter that was on a collision course with the Mauritania. The two ships closed and eventually collided within sight of the Statue of Liberty. The troopship had to return to the harbor briefly for repairs. The ship carried thousands of troops aboard. There were about 550 Rangers onboard. Raaen was appointed heavy gang officer. He had to work crews to bring provisions up from storage to the ship galleys. He had three sergeants and 50 new men every day. The work was hard and the days were long. Raaen’s responsibility was to order misbehaving men to fall in line. That provided the right to immediately court martial an individual if he did not perform his duties properly. Raaen’s only other duty was to report to the Ship’s Officer’s Bar for a beverage while his men worked on their detail for three hours. If some issue arose, Raaen was to take care of it, but the sergeants always took care of business.

John Raaen found England to be great duty in preparation for the invasion. It was apparent that the equipment buildup was huge. Fields were loaded with tanks and artillery. It seemed as if England would sink from the weight of vehicles and supplies. As headquarters commander, Raaen’s duty was to go out and survey different locations to assist the S4 [Annotator’s Note: supply and logistics officer atthe battalion level]. Training for the Rangers was rigorous but Raaen spent most of his time picking up equipment. There was a liberal pass policy for the nights in Lyminster where the Rangers were billeted. There were two hotels in town. One was designated the Officer’s Club and the other was the Enlisted Club. The Rangers were the only American military unit in the proximity so there were no issues. No paratroopers were there to fight over whether the infantry Rangers were authorized to wear the boots [Annotator’s Note: combat jump boots]. The Rangers were issued boots. As the ramp up toward the invasion continued and preparatory training proceeded, the Rangers learned very little about their mission. They knew that they were to assault a hostile shore and climb bluffs or hills and then make a quick speed march where they could encounter enemy opposition. The training was hard in a British commando center in Scotland. The same English sailors and ships with officers had participated in the landings in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio. While on the way to Normandy, the Rangers knew many of the coxswains and officers from their training in Scotland. That was very good. The 5th Ranger Battalion went to Broughton from Scotland where they learned to assault fortifications from an amphibious landing. It was then to Dorchester the staging area. The Fabius Exercise came in after the first stay there. Fabius was when maps and detailed sand tables with no names came out. The men began to learn specifically what the mission was to be. The men could tell approximately where the assault was to be just based on the geography and terrain shown on the maps and tables. Those same maps that were studied ahead of time were issued to the troops for the invasion but the locale names were put in at that time. Though no surrogate names for towns were used in the training, the Rangers learned exactly what the mission and terrain were to be. It was very good training. Once aboard the ships on 1 June, all of the maps and sand tables had names on them. The original mission of the Rangers consisted of three separate Ranger forces assaulting Normandy on D-Day. Force A would consist of companies D, E and F and a small element of the headquarters company of the 2nd Ranger Battalion that would assault Pointe du Hoc. There were to be two companies on the eastern face of the cliff and one company on the western face. Force B consisted of Company C, 2nd Ranger Battalion which was to come in parallel with the assaulting Company A, 116th Infantry Regiment and land on Omaha beach near the Pointe. They were to then follow to the right of the 116th and either move with them quickly up a draw or, alternatively, to climb the cliffs if need be to attack artillery at Pointe de la Percée. That artillery was about a mile from Vierville. Force C was the main Ranger force and consisted of the whole 5th Ranger Battalion plus two companies and the remainder of the headquarters company from the 2nd Rangers. Additionally, the Ranger group headquarters was part of that force. The intention was that Force C would land almost simultaneously with the 116th on their left and push through them toward their objectives including making their way to Pointe du Hoc which was nearly five miles away. During the Fabius Exercises, there was a consideration given to the 5th Rangers following the elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion in climbing Pointe du Hoc. The objectives would have been for the 5th to exploit the gains made by the 2nd at the top of the cliffs and then move inland and block the coastal road nearby from any possible reinforcements. That mission was shared by the elements of the 2nd Battalion that landed near Vierville. After the beachhead was stabilized, the 5th Ranger Battalion was to move on to Isigny via Grandcamp. The initial mission of the 29th Infantry Division was to capture Isigny as early as possible. If the 2nd Rangers did not communicate their success on Pointe du Hoc within a half an hour of their actual landing, the 5th Rangers and accompanying residual elements of the 2nd Rangers were to follow Company A, 116th Infantry in breaking through at the beach and proceeding across country to relieve the Rangers who had scaled the Pointe. Raaen and the 5th Rangers loaded aboard the transport ships using LCAs [Annotator’s Note: Landing Craft, Assault]. The Rangers also had permission to use the LCAs to move officers and senior non-coms between the five Ranger transport ships while at anchor. The men were bound to the ships for four days. They kept busy performing physical exercises and equipment and map training and preparations for the impending landing. The Rangers put to sea before Eisenhower called the ships back. The ship had not made it to the "eye of the needle" or Piccadilly Circus, as it was called, before recall. The ships returned in the dark. There was a bit of a letdown but morale stayed up. It was the standard hurry up and wait for the military. The ships departed the next early morning and met up at Piccadilly Circus. Having gone through the mine fields and rallied at that point, the troops felt assured that there was no turning back. This was to be the real invasion.

John Raaen saw an unbelievable number of ships on the morning of D-Day. There were thousands of ships all spaced apart. LCIs and LCMs [Annotator’s Note: LCI—Landing Craft, Infantry and Landing Craft, Medium] could not be hauled on the deck of a ship. Those two crafts were much slower than the LSIs, Landing Ships, Infantry, so they moved in and out of one another. Raaen stood watch for six hours prior to the landing even though he was only supposed to take two hours. He gave his former company commanding officer, Bill Wise [Annotator’s Note: Captain Wilmer K. Wise], a bit more sleep. Then it was Sullivan’s [Annotator’s Note: Major Richard P. Sullivan] turn. Raaen felt Sullivan was busy enough so he, Raaen, kept to the watch. He did about a five hour watch before the anchor was dropped. He had no time to sleep. He had to check weapons and men and get something to eat. K rations were the meal. At least the coffee was hot. Raaen did take the opportunity to eat before the landing. Many could not eat and some were seasick. The real seasickness came after the men loaded into their landing crafts and headed to the beach. It did not take long to load the boats. The Landing Craft, Assault, LCAs, were swung out from the ship and lowered from their davits to the deck height. The troops boarded the LCA after a thorough equipment check and confirmation of their presence. It took ten to 20 minutes for the cycle of loading each boat. The English captain of the ship sent off the Rangers with well wishes. That meant a lot to the departing troops. The little things meant a lot to them at that stage. The weather and waves were very rough en route to the beach. The LCA rides low in the water compared to the LCVP [Annotator’s Note: Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel also known as a Higgins Boat]. A lot of water was entering the LCA on the trip to the beach. The men pulled off their helmet shells and kept the liners on their head. The shells were then used to bail water out of the LCA. Although they did not get swamped, one boat did. It carried Company F and was Runny’s [Annotator’s Note: Captain William M. Runge] boat. A passing larger vessel picked up the men and landed them on Omaha Easy Green the next morning. The LCA crew was able to pump the water clear after slowing down from their six to eight knots pace. The stopped vessel got the pumps and engines running and circled back to pick up another load of troops. Raaen was with Sullivan in the same LCA making for shore. They made the men stay down most of the trip. Raaen stayed down and only got up when Sullivan called for him. Their radio, an SCR 300, was nearby but there was little talk until the actual landings. The communications picked up then. There was a beach master indicating that troops landing on Omaha Dog White were unopposed. When Raaen’s landing craft reached that designated landing location, he discovered that the message was not accurate at the time of his landing. When Raaen’s LCA reached a point halfway between Pointe du Hoc and Percée, it was about 15 minutes before or after H hour. The LCAs began circling offshore. The plan was established that if the 2nd Rangers did not provide a message of their success at Pointe du Hoc by 30 minutes after their landing, the 5th Rangers were to divert to a location near D1, the Vierville exit. It did not matter if the message was not heard or a failure message came through, the alternate plan was to be implemented. Only garbled messages were received so the alternative was taken though the 5th wanted to aid their fellow Rangers at the Pointe. There had been no training in climbing for the 5th but they still wished to aid their fellow Rangers. At 0710, the commander for all the Ranger forces offshore prior to beach landing ordered a diversion from the original plan. If the 5th had stayed another ten minutes, they would have gone up the cliffs with the elements of the 2nd Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. No message from the Pointe was received. Eikner [Annotator’s Note: Lieutenant James W. Eikner] was said to have sent a failure message, but it was not received by the 5th prior to its landing. The 5th Rangers were planned to land at Dog Green at D1. Instead, they were waved off by landing control from Dog Green because the word was that it was suicidal. The 5th moved over to Dog White somewhere around 0730. The first wave landed three boats together in Dog White, but two landed on Dog Green. Raaen was keeping his head down and did not see the first boats to land nor the two companies of the 2nd or their two headquarters elements. When the boats hit shore, Sullivan went left and Raaen went right. The water was only eight inches deep. He did not even get his trousers wet. Compared to landing with the water over the head, it was not bad at all.